Introduction
This paper revisits the charter value hypothesis (CVH) and the effectiveness of its riskdisciplining impact in the light of the major transformations of the banking industry before and after the global financial crisis of . Worldwide, in the years preceding the GFC, banks experienced tremendous changes. Specifically, value enhancing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) arrangements led banks to grow in size, become larger and more powerful by increasing their market shares, and yet, riskier (Anginer et al., 2014; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; De Jonghe and Vennet, 2008) . Mechanically, banks gained competitive advantage and an increase in their charter value, backed by size, operational complexity and higher profit expectations driven by more aggressive risk-taking policies (Jones et al., 2011; Furlong and Kwan, 2006; Stiroh, 2004) 1 . Such operations had altered bank charter value but also the importance of large "too-bigto-fail" (TBTF) banks and institutions which were later recognized as "systemically important financial institutions" (SIFIs) or "too-complex-to-unwind" banks 2 . These banks were at the heart of the GFC. They were deeply involved in complex activities and tended to accumulate less capital and less stable funds before the crisis while regulators, by focusing on microprudential regulation, did little to prevent the resulting build-up of systemic risk (Bostandzic and Weiss, 2016; Laeven et al., 2015; Brunnermeier et al., 2012) .
It is widely recognized that charter value (or franchise value, proxied by Tobin's q) selfdisciplines bank risk-taking, the so-called charter value hypothesis (CVH), and provides banks with a valuable source of monopoly power (Jones et al., 2011; Ghosh, 2009; González, 2005; Gan, 2004; Demsetz et al., 1996; Keeley, 1990) . Higher charter value is expected to lower risk-taking incentives and increase capital because of the higher bankruptcy costs that banks could endure if they fail. Nevertheless, banks have systematically looked for higher profitability, more returns and higher margins, by increasing their exposure to new market-based instruments and by extensively relying on short-term debt (Martynova et al., 2014) . This shift towards new financial instruments at a large scale and riskier business models is puzzling for banks with high charter value. 6 In line with previous research, we define very large "too-big-too-fail" banks institutions with total assets above $20 billion, large banks as those with total assets ranging from $1 billion to 20 billion and small banks as those with assets between $500 million and $1 billion (Köhler, 2015; Laeven et al., 2015; Barry et al., 2011; Lepetit et al., 2008) . Because of their specific business models, we exclude banks with less than $500 million of total assets (Distinguin et al., 2013) .
Standalone risk variables
We consider four standalone risk indicators that are equity based risk measures: total risk, bank-specific risk, systematic risk and a market based z-score. Total risk is computed as a moving standard deviation of bank stock daily returns. This is calculated each day for each bank using a moving window of 252 daily return observations. Similarly, we estimate the rest of the standalone risk measures with the following single index rolling market model 6 :
Where R i,t is the daily (t) stock return of bank i, R M,t the daily return on the market index of the country where the bank is located and ε i,t is the residual term. With this, β i,M , the equity market betas are used as a proxy of banks' systematic risk. From the residual term, we proxy the idiosyncratic risk. Hence, bank specific risk is estimated as the standard deviation of the residuals generated from the single index rolling regressions of a bank's daily stock returns on the market index.
Furthermore, we use the market z-score, a metric for insolvency risk and default which is calculated as follows: MZ-Score = (R i,t ̅̅̅̅ + 1) σ R i,t ⁄ , where R i,t ̅̅̅̅ is the mean and σ R i,t the standard deviation of the monthly returns for a given year. A higher value of MZ-Score indicates a lower probability of failure (Lepetit et al., 2008) .
Systemic risk measures
Besides the above standalone risk measures, we also consider four systemic risk measures.
First, we follow Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) and use the Marginal 7 Expected Shortfall (MES) which corresponds to the marginal participation of bank i to the Expected Shortfall (ES) of the financial system 7 . Formally, it corresponds to the expected stock return for bank i, conditional on the market return when the latter performs poorly. Acharya et al. (2012) define the MES as the expectation of the bank's equity return per dollar in year t conditional on a market crash in that given period. , ≡ ( , | , ≤ , ), ( 2 ) where , is the daily stock return for bank i, , is the daily market return 8 , q-percent is a prespecified extreme quantile enabling us to look at systemic events. , stands for Value-at-Risk, which is a critical threshold value that measures the worst expected market loss over a specific time period at a given confidence level. Herewith, we follow the common practice and set q at 5-percent, the term , ≤ VaR R M,t q reflects the set of days when the market return is at or below the 5-percent tail outcomes in that given year. Thus, under the nonparametric assumption, the MES is the average of bank stock returns during market crash times, that correspond to the 5percent worst days of the stock market index. It is expressed as: 
In equation ( 3 ), I (.) is the indicator function defining the set of days where the market experienced 5-percent worst days (crash period) and N is the number of days where the aggregate equity return of the entire market (proxied by a market index) experienced its 5-percent worst outcomes . The higher a bank's MES is (in absolute value), the higher is its contribution to aggregate systemic risk and so its probability to be undercapitalized in bad economic conditions. Second, we use CoVaR introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) as a similar concept as VaR. It corresponds to the of the entire financial system (i.e. the market index with a return of ) conditional on an extreme event leading to the fall of a bank i's stock return beyond its critical threshold level (VaR R i q ). | , is the q-percent quantile of this conditional probability distribution and can be written as 9 : −1 ( , ≤ | , | , = , ) = ( 4 ) Explicitly, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) define bank ∆CoVaR as the difference between the VaR of the financial system conditional on the firm being in distress and the VaR of the system conditional on the bank being in its median state. It catches the externality a bank causes to the entire financial system. Therefore, bank ∆CoVaR is the difference between the CoVaR R M|i,t q=distress state of the financial system when bank i is in financial distress, i.e. the bank stock return is at its bottom q probability level, and the CoVaR R M|i,t q=median of the financial system when this bank i is on its median return level, i.e. the inflection point at which bank performance starts becoming at risk.
Hence, CoVaR R M|i,t q measures the systemic risk contribution of bank i when its return is in its qpercent quantile (distress state). Here, we set q at 1-percent. Whereas, CoVaR R M|i,t q=50% measures the systemic risk contribution of bank i when bank i's is in a normal state. The ∆CoVaR R M|i,t q of individual ban is defined as:
Therefore, the systemic risk contribution of an individual bank i at q=1% can be written as: 50% ). ( 6 ) ∆CoVaR R M|i,t q is estimated given the bank i's unconditional VaRs, defined in equation ( 7 ) , and the conditional VaRs {CoVaR R M|i,t q =VaR R M,t q |VaR R i,t q }, defined in equation ( 8 ) . For bank's unconditional VaRs we run separately 1-percent and 50-percent quantile regressions, using daily stock prices over the whole period (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) . Specifically, we run the following quantile regressions over the sample period to obtain:
| ,
9 As MES, CoVaR is a conditional VaR computed at time t given information available at time t-1 based on the financial system Expected Shortfall.
Following regression model in equation ( 7 ) (Mayordomo et al., 2014; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) .
Third, as an extension of MES, Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES) has also been proposed by Acharya et al. (2012) . It is an approximation of equity values fall in the crisis scenarios when the market goes down below a given threshold, 40 percent over 180 days Acharya et al., 2012) . We use a similar approximation to compute a long-run MES based on a one-day MES (tail expectation of the bank's return conditional on a market decline) 10 :
The fourth measure of systemic risk is Tail-beta (quantile-beta), based on De Jonghe (2010) and Engle and Manganelli (2004) . It is obtained using a quantile regression model at the q prespecified quantile and captures bank's sensitivity to extreme movements. We use the model presented in equation ( 8 ) and run a 1-percent quantile regression and tail betas of each bank i are estimated by regressing daily bank stock return , on daily market return , . We predict tailbetas ( ,M ) as the market index coefficients in the 1-percent quantile regression. Thus, the spillover coefficient ( ,M ) measures the risk sensitivity of bank i at the 1% quantile. The larger is the spillover effect, the more vulnerable is bank i to a financial downturn.
Long-term performance: Bank charter value
Bank charter (franchise) value is our main explanatory variable and based on existing literature, we use Tobin's q as the proxy. Charter value equals the net present value of the expected stream of rents, which characterizes a bank's profit-generating potential beyond its merchantable assets (Marcus, 1984; Acharya, 1996; Demsetz et al., 1996) . This value reveals more information than bank size. It sums up intangible assets as goodwill, growth possibilities, economic rents, degree of market power, financial strength, etc. (Furlong and Kwan, 2006; Jones et al., 2011) . It is often used for comparability among varying size banks and/or banks with different pricing power (in loan, deposit or other marketable securities) (Keeley, 1990) . Furthermore, it has a cyclical feature and is also dependant on banks' earnings expectations (Saunders and Wilson, 2001) .
Hence, the advocates of the so-called CVH argue that when charter is built up, banks (i.e. shareholders) seek to preserve it from adverse shocks, otherwise it cannot be fully liquidated at the event of closure. Bankruptcy is costly when charter value is high, with regards also to the additional cost of failure (Jones et al., 2011; Hellmann et al., 2000; Demsetz et al., 1996) .
For publicly traded banks, Tobin's q is calculated as the bank's future economic profits reflected in the market value of assets (i.e. debt and market value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets. We follow Soedarmono et al. (2015) , Haq and Heaney (2012) , Gropp and Vesala (2004) and Keeley (1990) and define it as: ) where MVE i,t , BVL i,t and BVA i,t represent respectively: market value of equity, book value of liabilities and book value of assets of bank i at time t. Market value of equity is the annual average of daily bank market capitalization at year t and the two accounting measures denote values at the end of year t. The numerator of Tobin's q is the market value of assets, i.e. MVA i,t ≡ MVE i,t + BVL i,t . It refers partly to higher run-up in stocks price with regards to other investments. Whereas, the denominator reflects the accounting value of assets and is equal to: BVA i,t + BVE i,t (book value of equity).
Moreover, the literature highlights various factors that affect bank charter value. Furlong and Kwan (2006) and Demsetz et al. (1996) emphasize two main determinants: market regulation which leads to higher market power through M&A operations, and bank-related aspects other than market power as the expansion of off-balance sheet activities and noninterest income 11 . In a similar vein, González (2005) , Allen and Gale (2004) and Hellmann et al. (2000) argue that bank charter value stems from financial liberalization, regulatory restrictions, deposit insurance and competition 12 . Again, Haq et al. (2016) argue that market discipline, bank capital, contingent liabilities, and non-interest income are factors that enhance bank charter value. In fact, bank charter value may have multiple roles. According to the CVH, it gives banks self-disciplining incentives and restrains excessive risk-taking appetite. Nevertheless, Gropp and Vesala (2004) found the CVH to be only effective for small banks, with lower charter values and that such a result could reflect lower moral hazard with the introduction of explicit deposit insurance in Europe. However, for large banks which are presumably "TBTF", charter value does not explain their risk-taking.
Moreover, although many papers report a negative relationship between bank risk taking and bank charter value, consistent with the CVH (Park and Peristiani, 2007; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Hellmann et al., 2000; Demsetz et al., 1996; Keeley, 1990; Agusman et al., 2006) , others find a positive or a non-linear relationship, i.e. a "U" shape relationship (Niu, 2012; Haq and Heaney, 2012; Jones et al., 2011; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Saunders and Wilson, 2001; De Nicolo, 2001) .
Control variables
We consider various control variables in our regressions. Specifically, two main types of controls are considered: bank-specific controls and country-level determinants. For bank-specific controls, we follow the literature and account for bank size, the capital ratio, profitability, the bank's involvement in market-based activities, operational efficiency, and the bank's business model. Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total bank assets in U.S. dollars), the capital ratio is defined as total assets over equity and the return on assets as the ratio of net income to total assets). Ratio of net loans to total assets proxies asset mix and the cost-to-income ratio, which is measured by the importance of non-interest expense relatively to total operating revenue, proxies bank efficiency. As a proxy of bank complexity and diversification we use the ratio of non-interest income to total income (Ghosh, 2009; De Jonghe and Vennet, 2008) .
Regarding country-level factors that capture cross-country variations, we control for the gross domestic product growth rate and the annual inflation rate. We also introduce the overall capital stringency index to control for the extent to which regulatory requirements are strict and effective 12 Anginer et al. (2014) and Allen and Gale (2004) argue that in highly competitive markets, banks earn lower rents, which also reduces their incentives for monitoring. (Barth, et al., 2013) . We also consider macro-financial controls. We use interbank market rates to control for differences in interest rates and access to overnight cash markets across OECD countries (Haq et al., 2016; Furlong and Kwan, 2006) . We introduce the LIBOR-OIS spread (difference between London Interbank Offered Rate and Overnight Indexed Swap) as a proxy of the liquidity risk premium. Besides, we control for M&As by introducing a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if total assets grow by more than 15% in one year and 0 otherwise (De Jonghe and Öztekin, 2015) . Finally, we introduce year dummies to capture year-specific effects.
Summary statistics
Descriptive statistics of our variables are presented in Table 3 . The average (median) charter value is 1.06 (1.02), indicating that, on average, the market value of bank assets exceeds their book value by 5.60%. Dispersion in Charter value is relatively low with a standard deviation of 0.17. The remaining controls are comparable to what is observed in previous studies Laeven et al., 2015; Black et al., 2016; Niu, 2012; González, 2005) . With regard to risk measures, all the measures exhibit substantial variations over the 13 years covered by our study 13 . MES ranges between -1.13% and 9.63% with an average (standard deviation) of 1.56%
(1.83). ∆CoVaR varies around a mean (standard deviation) of 1.39% (1.71). Regarding standalone risk measures the average (standard deviation) values are 2.18% (1.22), 0.52 (0.52), 2.36% (1.27), and 53.64 (23.41) for specific risk, systematic risk, total risk and MZ-score, respectively. All indicators of standalone and systemic risk exhibit substantial volatility as their standard deviations are high, indicating high bank risk-taking and high exposure to default risk.
We report the pair-wise correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables in Table   4 . We perform the variance inflation factor (VIF) test which confirms the absence of major multicollinearity problems.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 ] 13 The differences in the number of observations is due to missing accounting and market data for some banks.
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Empirical specification
We consider a simultaneous equations model with unbalanced panel data. The specification of the second stage is represented by the following reduced form model: , = 1 ℎ̂, + 2 , −1 + 3 , + + + 2 , . ( 11 ) where, Risk i,t is a set of risk measures, subscripts i denotes individual banks and t denotes each Our empirical setup may suffer from reverse causality. High-chartered banks might be systemically important and/or involved in high risk activities, or vise-versa. We hence adopt an instrumental variable approach. In theory, bank charter value and risk taking may be simultaneously targeted (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Ghosh, 2009; Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005; Gropp and Vesala, 2004; Keeley, 1990) 14 . Some papers also argue that higher charter value may derive from high risky strategies (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; Saunders and Wilson, 2001; Park, 1997) .
To tackle possible endogeneity issues, we use the two-stage least squares (TSLS) instrumental variables method with fixed effects. In the first stage, we instrument and estimate charter value ℎ̂i ,t . Previous literature has identified different determinants of charter value (Furlong and Kwan, 2006; Jones et al., 2011) . Hereafter, we use three continuous and exogenous variables to instrument the charter value. First, we use the one year lagged value of charter value, assumed to be exogenous. Second, we follow González (2005) and include assets tangibility measured as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets to account for possible differences due to the extent of tangible assets, differences in efficiency, branching policy, or country size. Third, we follow Laeven and Levine, (2009) and Keeley (1990) and use market share defined as total assets of bank i over the aggregate assets of the banking system in a given country (all banks included, listed and non-listed) as a proxy of market power 15 . Subsequently in the second stage, risk regressions incorporate the predicted values of charter value from the first stage with the rest of the explanatory variables 16 .
To ensure the reliability of the subsequent empirical results at the second stage, we statistically test the validity and strength of the chosen instruments. Under heteroscedasticity and robust-clustering, we perform the Hansen j overidentifying restriction test to check the exogeneity of the instruments in the estimated models. The relevance of the three instruments is also assessed Table 5 displays TSLS estimations regarding standalone risk (even columns) and systemic risk (odd columns) over the pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and later (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . We match individual and systemic risk measures to investigate whether the impact of charter value may differ depending on the type of risk and economic conditions (pre-crisis period versus crisis and postcrisis). The coefficients estimates for bank charter value are positive and statistically significant at 1% in the pre-crisis period (columns 1-7), indicating that an increase in charter value is associated with an increase in bank individual risk and systemic risk over the pre GFC period. Similarly, the negative and significant relationship at the 1% level between charter value and the market-based z-score indicator (column 8) shows that higher charter value increases bank default. On the whole, table 5 shows that bank charter value and risk move together during the profitable, pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Therefore, the self-disciplining role induced by charter value is not effective during the years that preceded the GFC. However, during and after the crisis (2007-2013) the coefficients of charter value take the opposite sign consistent with the CVH. When we further split the 2007-2013 period into acute crisis (2007) (2008) (2009) ) and post crisis (2010-2013) periods (Table 6 ), we find that the disciplining effect of charter value is only effective after the crisis and that charter value does not play any role during the crisis.
Results
Impact of charter value on bank risk taking
The impact of charter value on risk is also economically meaningful. For instance, before the crisis a one standard deviation increase in the charter value (0.17) leads to an increase in the MES of 1.4% (8.03*0.17) (column 1 of Table 5 ) and a decrease in the MES in the subsequent period 0.11% (-0.66*0.17) (column 1 of Table 6 , period [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] ).
Regarding the control variables, most of them enter significantly and the coefficients carry the signs obtained in previous studies. Bank size has a positive and statistically significant effect on systemic risk and systematic risk and a negative and statistically significant effect on the rest of standalone risk variables. The coefficient of the capital ratio variable is positive and statistically significant for systemic and systematic risk but significantly negative for the other standalone risk proxies. The coefficient of the return on assets is negative and significant in all periods for all risk measures, indicating that a higher ROA is associated with lower risk. The coefficient of the M&A dummy is significantly positive but only for systematic risk and systemic risk. With respect to macroeconomic factors, the inflation rate has a significantly positive impact on risk measures.
Thus, in presence of bad economic conditions such as inflationary pressures or high interbank rates, banks become riskier and more vulnerable to systemic shocks. On the whole, as expected, the coefficients of economic growth are negative and significant but they are nevertheless positive and significant for systemic risk measures in the pre-crisis period. This suggests that although higher economic growth is good for individual bank stability it might have an adverse effect on the threat that banks might pose to the entire financial system. The coefficients of the capital stringency index are negative and significant, suggesting that regulation is effective in lowering risk.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6] In what follows, we go deeper in the investigation of the positive relationship between charter value and bank risk during the pre-crisis period. Specifically, we test whether differences in risktaking culture across countries, bank size, and growth and diversification strategies are possible drivers of such an unexpected impact of charter value on risk.
Charter value-bank risk relationship: the impact of cross-country heterogeneity, bank size, and growth and diversification strategies
The relationship between charter value and bank risk may depend on differences in risk taking cultures. For instance, Japanese banks are well known to be more conservative than their U.S. counterparts (Haq et al., 2016) . We therefore take advantage of the heterogeneity of our OECD bank sample that comprises different countries and financial systems (market-based vs.
bank-based financial systems). We define three geographical sub-groups: U.S., European countries and the rest of OECD countries (which is dominated by Japan). [Insert Table 7] In the next step, we only keep U.S. and European banks, i.e. we eliminate from our sample banks from the rest of OECD countries for which the relationship between charter value and bank risk is not significant, and test whether the charter value-bank risk relationship may be influenced by bank size. Table 8 reports the results. We find that a high charter value increases both standalone and systemic risks for very large and large banks; whereas for small banks, such a relationship is not found for half of our specifications (columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Table 8 ).
[Insert Table 8] Lastly, we consider the sample of very large and large banks for which the positive relationship between charter value and risk is confirmed and explore if differences in growth strategies and business models alter such a relationship. We define banks with high growth strategies as those in the top 75 th percentile of bank total assets variation 18 during the pre GFC period, while banks with low growth strategies are those in the bottom 25 th percentile. We use similar cutoffs for the business model and consider the variation of the non-traditional income ratio as an indicator of bank diversification 19 . Tables 9 and 10 display the results. While the positive impact of charter value on both standalone and systemic risks is confirmed for the sample of very large banks regardless of the growth strategies (Table 9 , Panels A and B), we do find differences for the sample of large banks. In fact, for the latter sample, charter value has no impact on both standalone and systemic risks when banks are characterized by a low growth strategy (Table 9 , Panel A). As regards to bank business model, a quasi-similar pattern is noticeable. Irrespective of the degree of diversification (activity-mix), the positive impact of charter value on bank risk is also confirmed for the sample of very large banks. Nevertheless, compared to the previous findings, the impact on standalone risk is weaker for less diversified banks (Table 10 , Panel B, even columns), while it is non-existent when considering the systemic risk measures for highly diversified banks (Table 10 , Panels A, odd columns). Considering the sample of large banks, 18 Growth strategy (business model) variation is computed as the change over the pre-GFC period (between 2000 and 2006) in total assets (diversification ratio) over the average total assets (diversification ratio) (see descriptive statistics, Table 3 ). 19 We use the ratio of non-interest income to total income as the diversification ratio. Alternately, we consider the ratio of non-interest income to operating income and obtain similar results. charter value is positively associated with both standalone and systemic risks only when banks have a strong diversification strategy (Table 10 , Panel B).
[Insert Tables 9 and 10]
Robustness checks and conclusion
Robustness checks
To check the robustness of the results, we proceed as follows. Firstly, the definition of TBTF banks we consider (banks with total assets above $20 billion) is presumably more accurate for banks operating in the most developed banking systems but less appropriate for the less developed OECD countries. Therefore, we keep the absolute size criterion of total assets above $20 billion for banks operating in the world's top 10 economies, and for the rest of the OECD countries in our sample, we use bank size relative to GDP. Very large banks with respect to the home country's GDP are defined as those with a ratio above 10 percent (De Jonghe et al., 2014) .
We re-estimate the regressions (Tables 8, 9 and 10) and find similar conclusions. We find that charter value has a positive and significant impact on bank risk-taking during the pre GFC period for large banks and very large (TBTF) banks (Tables 11 and 12 ). Considering growth and diversification strategies during the pre-crisis period (Tables 13 and 14) , the results support our earlier findings although for very large banks, we note some minor differences: the relationship between charter value and standalone risk is no longer significant when banks pursue a high growth strategy and the relationship becomes significant when banks have a strong diversification strategy. Secondly, we consider an alternative proxy of charter value. We use the standardized market value added (MVA) 20 and market-to-book ratio and obtain similar conclusions (Table 15 ). Tables 16 and 17 , we use the median as a new cutoff to define high and low bank growth and diversification strategies during the pre-crisis period, instead of the top 75 th and bottom 25 th quartiles of total assets and non-traditional income ratio variations. Consistent with our results, we find that in the presence of an expansion strategy (above the median), a higher charter value leads to an increase of both individual and systemic risks, during the pre GFC period (Tables 16, Panels 20 We calculate the standardized market value added MVA as (current market capitalization -total equity) divided by total equity.
Finally, in
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A). Similarly, in presence of strong diversification strategies (above the median of the nontraditional income ratio variation), charter value increases both risk dimensions for very large and large banks (Tables 17, Panel A) . Meanwhile, for banks following a low growth strategy (below the median increase in total assets), a positive relationship between charter value and both risk measures is found only for very large banks (Tables 16, Panel B ). Our results are therefore robust to alternative definitions of TBTF banks, charter value and the choice of cutoffs.
[Insert Tables 11, 12 and 13]
Conclusion
Previous studies on the relationship between charter value and bank risk-taking have mainly focused on standalone risk measures and report mixed results. Although higher charter value is generally considered as beneficial in terms of bank stability, by reducing a bank's risk taking incentives, some studies find this relationship not be linear. This paper considers both standalone and systemic risk measures and shows that the relationship between charter value and risk is different during normal times and distress periods dependent on the state of the economy and the business cycle. Specifically, based on our investigation of 859 publicly-traded banks in 28 OECD countries over the 2000-2013 period, we find that before the global financial crisis charter value positively impacted both individual and systemic risks. Such a behavior is mostly effective for large "too-big-to-fail" banks with aggressive diversification strategies or other large banks with fast growth policies. Our findings highlight that instead of mitigating risk, charter value may have provided incentives to accumulate risk which in turn might have contributed to higher systemic risk. By contrast, the results show that during, and more specifically after, the global financial crisis, banks tend to protect their charter value and lessen their risk exposure thereby reducing their contribution to systemic risk.
Our findings have important policy implications. The one size fits all capital conservation buffers introduced by Basel III may not be enough to guarantee bank stability and should not only be based on the business cycle but also on the state of the financial system. Although banks are required to accumulate buffers during economic upturns, banks with a stronger position with higher charter value might be building up more aggressive expansion strategies during bullish 20 financial markets. Regulators and supervisors should hence closely look into the behavior of very large "too-big-to fail banks" and large banks with high growth or strong diversification (business mix) strategies. For such banks the impact of charter value on bank stability can be a double-edged sword. Table 3 . Regression results for various bank risk measures on bank charter value over the pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , during and the post-crisis period (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . In all regressions, columns report second stage coefficients from a two-stage least squares (TSLS) IV estimator with bank-specific fixed effects, time dummies and a robust-clustering at the bank-level. Results of model Risk i,t = β 1 ℎ̂i ,t + β 2 i,t−1 + β 3 i,t + λ t + μ i,t + ε 2i,t , where dependent variables are four systemic risk measures: MES, Tail-beta, CoVaR and LRMES (models in the odd columns: 1,3,5,7), matched with four standalone risk measures: specific risk, systematic risk, total risk and market z-score (models in the even columns: 2,4,6,8). Bank charter value (Charter, proxied by Tobin's q) is modelled endogenously in all regressions. We instrument Charter by its one-year lagged value, Tangibility=tangible assets ratio and Market share = bank total assets over domestic total assets of the country banking system. Regressions control for one-year lagged banklevel characteristics to mitigate endogeneity concerns and possible omitted variables. We control also for macro-financial variables and country-level variables. Year dummies are not reported. Definitions of control variables are: Size=natural log of total assets, Loans=Loans to total assets, Diversification=non-interest income over total income, Efficiency=cost income over total income, CAPR=capital ratio, equity to total assets, ROA= Return on assets, d(merger)= dummy takes one if the bank experienced a merger-acquisition event (annul total assets variation exceeds 15%), and zero otherwise, and zero otherwise, d(crisis)= dummy takes one during crisis time (2007) (2008) (2009) , and zero otherwise, GDP=gross domestic product growth, Inflation=annual inflation rate and Cap_String=capital stringency. Heteroscedasticity consistent and robust standard errors t statistics are in brackets below their coefficients estimates. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Regression results for various bank risk measures on bank charter value over the acute-crisis period (2007) (2008) (2009) and the post-crisis period (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . In all regressions, columns report second stage coefficients from a two-stage least squares (TSLS) IV estimator with bank-specific fixed effects, time dummies and a robust-clustering on the bank-level. Results of model Risk i,t = β 1 ℎ̂i ,t + β 2 i,t−1 + β 3 i,t + λ t + μ i,t + ε 2i,t , where dependent variables are four systemic risk measures: MES, Tail-beta, CoVaR and LRMES (models in the odd columns: 1,3,5,7), matched with four standalone risk measures: specific risk, systematic risk, total risk and market z-score (models in the even columns: 2,4,6,8). Bank charter value (Charter, proxied by Tobin's q) is modelled endogenously in all regressions. We instrument Charter by one-year lagged Charter, tangible assets ratio and market share. Regressions control for one-year lagged bank-level characteristics to mitigate endogeneity concerns and possible omitted variables. We control also for macro-financial variables and country-level variables. Year dummies are not reported. Definitions of all variables are listed in Table 3 . Heteroscedasticity consistent and robust standard errors t statistics are in brackets below their coefficients estimates. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. shows regression results on the effect of TBTF (Very large banks) and size (Large and Small banks) on the relation between charter value and risk for U.S. and European banks over the pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Very large banks (TBTF) are defined as banks with total assets above $20 billion, Large banks as those with total ranging $1 and 20 billion and Small banks those with total assets between $500 million and $1 billion. In all regressions, columns report second stage coefficients from a two-stage least squares (TSLS)
IV estimator with bank-specific fixed effects, time dummies and a robust-clustering on the bank-level. Results of model Risk i,t = β 1 ℎ̂i ,t + β 2 i,t−1 + β 3 i,t + λ t + μ i,t + ε 2i,t , where dependent variables are four systemic risk measures: MES, Tail-beta, CoVaR and LRMES (models in the odd columns: 1,3,5,7), matched with four standalone risk measures: specific risk, systematic risk, total risk and market z-score (models in the even columns: 2,4,6,8 Table shows regression results on the effect of bank growth strategies on the relation between charter value and risk for U.S. and European banks over the pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Panel A reports estimation results for banks group with a high growth strategies (Q75, top quartile of bank total assets variation during the pre-crisis period) and Panel B reports estimation results for banks group with a low growth strategies (Q25, bottom quartile of bank total assets variation during the pre-crisis period). Panels differentiate between Very large banks (with total assets above $20 billion) and Large banks (with total assets ranging $1 and 20 billion). In all regressions, columns report second stage coefficients from a two-stage least squares (TSLS) IV estimator with bank-specific fixed effects, time dummies and a robust-clustering on the bank-level. Results of model Risk i,t = β 1 ℎ̂i ,t + β 2 i,t−1 + β 3 i,t + λ t + μ i,t + ε 2i,t , where dependent variables are four systemic risk measures: MES, Tail-beta, CoVaR and LRMES (models in the odd columns: 1,3,5,7), matched with four standalone risk measures: specific risk, systematic risk, total risk and market z-score (models in the even columns: 2,4,6,8 Table shows regression results on the effect of business models on the relation between charter value and risk for U.S. and European banks over the pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Panel A reports estimation results for banks group with a strong diversification strategies (Q75, top quartile of diversification ratio variation during the pre-crisis period) and Panel B reports estimation results for banks group with a focused growth strategies (Q25, bottom quartile of diversification ratio variation during the pre-crisis period). Panels differentiate between Very large banks (with total assets above $20 billion) and Large banks (with total assets ranging $1 and 20 billion). In all regressions, columns report second stage coefficients from a two-stage least squares (TSLS) IV estimator with bank-specific fixed effects, time dummies and a robust-clustering on the bank-level. Results of model Risk i,t = β 1 ℎ̂i ,t + β 2 i,t−1 + β 3 i,t + λ t + μ i,t + ε 2i,t , where dependent variables are four systemic risk measures: MES, Tailbeta, CoVaR and LRMES (models in the odd columns: 1,3,5,7), matched with four standalone risk measures: specific risk, systematic risk, total risk and market z-score (models in the even columns: 2,4,6,8). Bank charter value (Charter) is modelled endogenously in all regressions. We instrument Charter by one-year lagged Charter, tangible assets ratio and market share. Regressions control for one-year lagged bank-level characteristics to mitigate endogeneity concerns and possible omitted variables. We control also for macro-financial variables and country-level variables. Control variables and year dummies are not reported. 11.87*** 11.90*** 11.49*** 11.90*** 11.87*** 11.87*** 11.87*** 11.87*** 6.848* 6.852* 7.086* 6.828* 6.831* 6.784* 6.848* Tables (11-14) present regression results for an alternative definition of TBTF effects on the relation between charter value and risk for all OECD listed banks in pre-crisis period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . TBTF is defined as: (i) bank with total assets above $20 billion for the world's top 10 economies and (ii) for the rest of OECD countries, bank that is very large with respect to the home GDP (i.e. more than 10%). Large banks are defined as banks with total assets between $1 and 20 billion. In all regressions, columns report second stage coefficients from a two-stage least squares (TSLS) IV estimator with bankspecific fixed effects, time dummies and a robust-clustering on the bank-level. Results of model Risk i,t = β 1 ℎ̂i ,t + β 2 i,t−1 + β 3 i,t + λ t + μ i,t + ε 2i,t , where dependent variables are four systemic risk measures: MES, Tail-beta, CoVaR and LRMES (models in the odd columns: 1,3,5,7), matched with four standalone risk measures: specific risk, systematic risk, total risk and market z-score (models in the even columns: 2,4,6,8). Bank charter value (Charter) is modelled endogenously in all regressions. We instrument Charter by one-year lagged Charter, tangible assets ratio and market share. Regressions control for one-year lagged bank-level characteristics to mitigate endogeneity concerns and possible omitted variables. We control also for macro-financial variables and country-level variables. Control variables and year dummies are not reported. Table displays the results on the baseline model for standardized market-value-added (SMVA) and market-to-book ratio, as an alternative definition of bank charter value (Charter_Alternative). SMVA is computed as the difference between the market value and capital contribution over book value of equity normalized by total equity. In all regressions, columns report second stage coefficients from a two-stage least squares (TSLS) IV estimator with bank-specific fixed effects, time dummies and a robust-clustering on the bank-level. Results of model Risk i,t = β 1 ℎ _̂i ,t + β 2 i,t−1 + β 3 i,t + λ t + μ i,t + ε 2i,t , where dependent variables are four systemic risk measures: MES, Tail-beta, CoVaR and LRMES (models in the odd columns: 1,3,5,7), matched with four standalone risk measures: specific risk, systematic risk, total risk and market z-score (models in the even columns: 2,4,6,8). SMVA (and market-to-book ratio) is modelled endogenously in all regressions. We instrument SMVA (and market-to-book ratio) by one-year lagged Charter_Alternative, tangible assets ratio and market share. Regressions control for one-year lagged bank-level characteristics to mitigate endogeneity concerns and possible omitted variables. We control also for macro-financial variables and country-level variables. Control variables and year dummies are not reported.
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